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Abstract 
Introduction In the containment phase of the response to the COVID-19 outbreak, Public Health 
England (PHE) delivered advice to travellers arriving at major UK ports. We aimed to rapidly evaluate 
the impact and effectiveness of these communication materials for passengers in the early stages of 
the pandemic. 
Methods In stage I (Patient and Public Involvement, PPI) we interviewed seven travellers who had 
returned from China in January and February 2020. We used these results to develop a 
questionnaire and topic guides for stage II, a cross-sectional survey and follow-up interviews with 
passengers arriving at London Heathrow Airport on scheduled flights from China and Singapore. The 
survey assessed passengers’ knowledge of symptoms, actions to take and attitudes towards PHE 
COVID-19 public health information; interviews explored their views of official public health 
information and self-isolation.  
Results In stage II, 121 passengers participated in the survey and 15 in follow-up interviews. 83% of 
surveyed passengers correctly identified all three COVID-19 associated symptoms listed in PHE 
information at that time. Most could identify the recommended actions and found the advice 
understandable and trustworthy. Interviews revealed that passengers shared concerns about the 
lack of wider official action, and that passengers’ knowledge had been acquired elsewhere as much 
from PHE. Respondents also noted their own agency in choosing to self-isolate, partially as a self-
protective measure. 
Conclusion PHE COVID-19 public health information was perceived as clear and acceptable, but we 
found that passengers acquired knowledge from various sources and they saw the provision of 
information alone on arrival as an insufficient official response. Our study provides fresh insights into 
the importance of taking greater account of diverse information sources and of the need for public 
assurance in creating public health information materials to address global health threats. 
Keywords COVID-19, public health advice, government, policy, airport, international travel 
 
 
What is already known? 
• In the containment phase, PHE issued public health advice at the major UK ports of entry to 
arriving travellers in response to the COVID-19 outbreak. 
What are the new findings? 
• The majority of passengers correctly identified all three symptoms of COVID-19 highlighted in 
the PHE advice at the time and understood the importance of reporting symptoms and self-
isolation. 
• Knowledge about COVID-19 was also acquired elsewhere and was often more extensive than the 
information provided in official PHE guidance. 
• PHE advice was perceived as clear and acceptable but insufficient on its own as an official 
response to the pandemic. 
What do the new findings imply? 
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• Our evaluation shows that while the PHE leaflets and posters met the intended aim of providing 
information and guidance, passengers used the provision of information and other visible public 
health measures to judge the adequacy of governmental response to the pandemic. 
• Our study provides fresh insights into the need to take greater account of the diverse 
information sources from which international travellers may draw.  
• Our study indicates that public health measures instituted at borders should be appraised not 
only with respect to their functional effectiveness in contributing to infection control, but also 
for their perceived effectiveness in furnishing public assurance of official action to contain the 
disease threat, which could be helpful in building public trust and thereby encouraging 
adherence to official guidelines.  
• Our study demonstrates the complexity of health policy decision-making in public health 
emergencies of international importance and highlights the importance of establishing efficient 
mechanisms for rapid appraisal and feedback to public health and regulatory authorities of 
evidence that could contribute to containment and control of epidemic disease threats. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Large-scale frequent international population movements are occurring in our globalised societies, 
with international arrivals growing to 1.186 billion in 2015.[1] The increasing connectivity between 
countries has increased pressure on prevention and containment of global disease outbreaks. The 
current COVID-19 pandemic is a major threat which has profound and serious impacts on global 
public health. In December 2019, pneumonia cases of unknown aetiology were reported in Wuhan, 
China;[2] this illness was linked to a novel coronavirus on the 7th of January 2020.[3] The first cases 
of COVID-19 in England were reported on 29th January in two people who had recently arrived from 
China. Initial cases were mostly associated with international travel. As of the 13th September 2020, 
there have been 368,504 positive cases in the UK.  
Alongside pharmaceutical interventions, public health information is essential to controlling the 
COVID-19 pandemic.[4] Provision of public health advice at ports of entry, including the symptoms 
and actions to take if they develop, was most recently used in the UK in the context of the response 
to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014/15, which was appreciated and considered as 
reassuring for the public by travellers.[5] During the containment phase of the COVID-19 response, 
when the epicentre of the outbreak was in Asia, public health information was delivered to travellers 
arriving at UK ports up to the point when extensive travel restrictions were implemented. The 
Airport Public Health Monitoring Operations Centre established by Public Health England (PHE) was 
activated on 25th January to monitor all direct flights from China to LHR, and operations were 
extended to include all direct flights to London Gatwick and Manchester on 29th January. Measures 
directed at passengers travelling from affected countries into the UK included a broadcast message 
to passengers made on incoming aircraft, to encourage travellers to report their illness; posters 
containing COVID-19 related public health advice displayed at these three airports; and leaflets 
containing this advice provided to passengers by airlines on board the flight and/or made available 
on arrival. Up to 13th March (the last data collection time point of this study), these leaflets and 
posters were updated three times, with key information summarised in Box 1. Contact tracing was 
undertaken when a case was reporting including flights and other transport. Since 8th June, more 
restrictive rules have been instituted for incoming passengers: people who enter or return to the UK 
are required to provide their journey and contact details and self-isolate for 14 days if arriving from 
an affected country, with penalties of up to £1,000 for breaking this rule.[6] These regulations 
continue to be amended, with exemptions for travellers arriving from specified countries of origin.  
The ongoing risk associated with travel highlights the importance of interventions that target 
arriving passengers to control transmission and protect the public. A previous study showed the 
importance of evaluating interventions delivered during international epidemics to inform the 
design of similar initiatives and to ensure their acceptability and adherence in the future.[5] The aim 
of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness and impact of PHE COVID-19 related communication 
materials for passengers arriving at UK airports during the containment phase of the response (24th 
January to 12th March).  The study was conducted at the request of the Department of Health and 
Social Care via the National Institute of Health Research.  Adjustments to the study protocol were 
made due to the fast-changing situation, as the number of flights carrying passengers into the UK 
dropped substantially in the monitoring period, from 16-18 flights per day from China (including 
Hong Kong) into LHR in the third week of January, to only 9 flights per week by the end of January, 
with air traffic reducing further in the subsequent months. Internal data from LHR indicated that in 
March a total of 123 flight arrived from China, Hong Kong and Singapore, one-fifth of the number in 
February. 
 
Box 1. Key messages of leaflets and posters distributed at major ports of entry in England (in 
English and simplified Chinese) 
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Version Developed/ 
Updated Date 
Case Definition  Advice 
1 23/Jan/2020 A new infection has been detected in Wuhan, 
China 
If you have been to Wuhan, China, in the last 
14 days and develop ANY of these symptoms: 
Cough, Sore throat, Difficulty breathing, 
Fever, Runny nose 
Contact a healthcare 
professional 
If you develop symptoms within 
14 days of travel to Wuhan, 
please stay indoors and avoid 
contact with others where 
possible. Ring 111 or call your 
GP and tell them that you have 
travelled to Wuhan, for free 
advice and treatment 
2 31/Jan/2020 If you have been to Wuhan, or Hubei 
Province, China in the last 14 days… 
Stay indoors and avoid contact 
with others 
Contact NHS 111 for advice 
Please follow this advice even if 
you do not have symptoms of 
the virus 
• Do not go to work, school, 
or public areas 
• Avoid visitors in your home 
• Avoid using public 
transport or taxi 
If you have been to anywhere on mainland 
China in the last 14 days and develop any of 
these symptoms 
Cough, fever, shortness of breath 
Stay indoors and call NHS 111 
3 07/Feb/2020 If you have a cough, or fever, or shortness of 
breath and have been to any of these places 
in the last 14 days: 
China, Thailand, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Macau 
Stay indoors and call NHS 111 
If you have been to Wuhan, or Hubei 
Province, China in the last 14 days… 
Stay indoors and contact NHS 
111 even if you do not have 
symptoms 
4 25/Feb/2020 If you have a cough, or fever, or shortness of 
breath and have been to any of these places 
in the last 14 days: 
China, Macau, Thailand, Vietnam, Japan, 
Cambodia, Republic of Korea, Laos, Hong 
Kong, Myanmar, Taiwan, Northern Italy 
(north of Pisa), Singapore, Malaysia 
Stay indoors and call NHS 111 
If you have returned from these specific 
areas: 
Iran, Daegu or Cheongdo in South Korea, 
Specified towns in the Lombardy and Veneto 
regions in Northern Italy, Hubei province 
(Returned in the past 14 days) 
Make your way to your 
residence. Stay indoors and 
contact NHS 111 even if you do 
not have symptoms 
Source from: https://campaignresources.phe.gov.uk/resources/search  
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METHODS  
We undertook a two-stage mixed-methods evaluation, starting with patient and public involvement 
(PPI) interviews with Chinese students and staff at two UK universities, followed by a survey and 




Stage I: Staff and students from two universities in England who had returned to the UK from China 
in January and February 2020.  
Stage II: Returning travellers aged 18 years and over from any nationality, arriving into LHR airport 
from affected countries after PHE leaflets and posters began to be distributed on 23rd January. 
 
Sampling and methods 
Stage I – Patient and Public Involvement (PPI) interviews 
Volunteers were recruited from King’s College London and University of Bristol though invitations 
posted on internal websites and e-lists and snowball sampling. One-to-one telephone interviews of 
approximately 30 minutes were conducted between 4th and 14th February 2020. Participants with 
recent experience of arriving from Asia were asked about what they had seen at the airport, and 
their comments on PHE information and advice about COVID-19 were elicited. To facilitate this, we 
provided participants with copies of the leaflets and posters being displayed at airports. The 
interviews were audio recorded; data from each interview was summarised and synthesised to build 
a final report. Based on the PPI results, a questionnaire and interview topic guides were developed 
for Stage II.  
 
Stage II – Airport cross-sectional survey and follow-up interviews 
Cross-sectional survey 
Passengers arriving into LHR airport, UK on three scheduled flights operated by three airlines on 4th 
March from Singapore and on 12th March and 13th March from China, were recruited into the survey. 
During the study period, PHE information listed both these countries as places of origin that 
necessitated advice for travellers, with Hubei and Wuhan in China highlighted as special places of 
origin with separate advice. Instructions were provided to airline crews in advance. Paper 
questionnaires provided in English, Mandarin and Cantonese versions and the leaflets produced by 
PHE in English and simplified Chinese script were issued by crew to all passengers for completion 
prior to disembarkation. There were in total 11 questions included in the questionnaire to collect 
information on three main aspects, including: participants’ knowledge of COVID-19 symptoms (Q1) 
and help-seeking behaviours (Q2), whether participants received the public health advice (Q3) and 
their views on it (Q4), and their demographic information (Q5-Q11).  
Respondents were also invited to record their name and contact details on the questionnaires if 
willing to take part in follow-up interviews. Researchers then met passengers at disembarkation 
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Passengers who consented to participate in a follow-up interview were contacted by email to 
confirm an interview time and language preference (English/Mandarin). Follow-up emails were sent 
out after 10 days if no response was received. After confirmation by participants, one-to-one 
telephone interviews of approximately 30 minutes were conducted between 2nd and 23rd April 2020.  
During the interview, participants were asked about the COVID-19 information they received during 
their journey and their thoughts on the PHE information and advice provided. If interviewees had 
developed symptoms since arriving in the UK and were self-isolating/had self-isolated, they were 
also asked about their views and experiences of self-isolation using a separate topic guide.  
All interviews were audio-recorded, and researchers created summaries of each interview. English 
interviews were transcribed verbatim; Mandarin interviews were transcribed directly into English.  
 
Data analysis 
Categorical data were described as proportions and continuous data as median with interquartile 
range (IQR). All analyses were conducted in Stata v15.1 (2017, StataCorp LLC, College Station, TX).  
Interview transcripts were coded initially using open coding. An initial coding framework was 
collaboratively developed by four researchers (TZ, SC, CS, WR) each coding one of the interviews 
they had conducted. Memos on emerging ideas and possible relationships between codes were kept 
alongside initial codes, and codes that represented similar concepts were assembled into conceptual 
categories and themes. Two (TZ, SC) of the research team then used the codes and categories in the 
framework to index each transcript in NVivo 12 Pro. Coding was performed iteratively within and 




This study was a form of service evaluation, therefore no ethical approval was required. This was 
confirmed by PHE’s ethics committee - PHE Research Ethics and Governance Group. 
 
RESULTS 
Stage I – PPI interviews 
Our PPI interviews included seven Chinese participants, five university students and two full-time 
employed staff, who had flown into the UK between 15th January and 7th February.  All listed cough, 
difficulty breathing and fever as COVID-19 symptoms and stated that they would stay at home and 
call NHS 111 if they were symptomatic. In terms of official advice at that time, most participants 
believed the advice focusing on people travelling from Wuhan/Hubei was redundant following the 
compulsory lockdown in Wuhan. Conversely, the guidance on self-isolation and calling NHS 111 was 
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seen as sensible and good advice; two participants (both employed) had voluntarily self-isolated 
when arriving in the UK as a precaution despite having no symptoms. Interviewees also expressed 
concerns about barriers to following this advice, such as important exams that students must attend, 
difficulties isolating from other people in a shared house, and potential language barriers to 
contacting NHS 111. 
 
 
Stage II – Airport cross-sectional survey and follow-up interviews 
Survey results  
Demographic characteristics 
In total, 121 completed questionnaires from passengers on three flights operated by different 
airlines (Singapore Airlines, Air China and China Eastern Airlines) were collected. While 121 
questionnaires were completed to a standard sufficient for inclusion, there was still some missing 
data due to people skipping some questions, putting prefer not to say, or illegible writing. Of those 
who answered (n=117), the age range was 20 to 81 years (median 53, IQR 36–64 years); 48/120 
(40.0%) were male and 72/120 (60.0%) female. Just over half of respondents were British (n=64/118; 
54.2%), 25.4% (n=30/118) were Chinese and 20.3% (n=24/118) ‘Other’. The majority of respondents 
could read English fluently (n=99/118; 84.0%), 14 were bilingual and 4 trilingual. There were 17 
(14.4%) who could only read Mandarin and 1 (1.0%) who could only read Cantonese. None of the 
respondents had been to Wuhan city of Hubei province in mainland China in the 14 days prior to 
arriving at LHR.  
 
Knowledge of symptoms and actions to take 
Table 1. Recognition of COVID-19 symptoms in a sample of 121 passengers arriving at London 





Symptoms listed in PHE information   












Symptoms not listed in the PHE information   
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Note: Percentages in table 1 treat ‘missing’ as another group since ‘Not sure’ was not an option offered for this 
question 
 
The majority of respondents correctly identified a fever/high temperature (87.6%), difficulty 
breathing (87.6%) and cough (85.1%) as the symptoms associated with COVID-19 (Table 1). In line 
with the official case definition at the time (described in the PHE leaflets as cough, fever or shortness 
of breath), 101 (83%) of 121 respondents identified all three symptoms as symptoms of COVID-19. 
Other symptoms not included in PHE’s advice were also reported by passengers as COVID symptoms 
including commonly fatigue (57.9%), sore throat (52.9%) and headache, chills/shivering, aching 
limbs, runny nose and sneezing (>40%). 
Most participants were correctly aware that people with COVID-19 might not show symptoms 
straight away (77.1%) and that asymptomatic status could last for 14 days (75.4%). 92.4% of 
participants also thought that people with COVID-19 can be contagious, even if they did not develop 
any symptoms. A minority of respondents (9.3%) mistakenly thought antibiotics could treat COVID-
19 but a substantial proportion (27.1%) were uncertain about this. 
 
Table 2. Knowledge of health-seeking behaviour in a sample of 121 passengers arriving 
at London Heathrow airport from COVID-19 affected countries between 4th and 13th 
March, 2020. 




Not sure  
N (%) 
Statement advised in PHE information     
If someone arriving in the UK has been to Wuhan 
in mainland China in the past 14 days, they should 







If someone arriving in the UK has been to Wuhan 
in mainland China in the past 14 days, they should 







Statement not advised in PHE information     
If someone arriving in the UK has been to 
Singapore in the past 14 days, they should stay 
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If someone arriving in the UK has been to 
Singapore in the past 14 days, they should call NHS 







Note: Percentages are for those who responded to the statement 
 
Table 2 shows that most passengers were able to identify the recommended actions to take if they 
had been to Wuhan in the previous 14 days – to self-isolate (96.6%) and call NHS 111 for advice 
(84.6%). Respondents were less confident about actions to take for those who had been to other 
highlighted destinations (Box 1, versions 3 & 4); For people who had travelled to Singapore in the 
past 14 days, the majority correctly stated that they should not take any action if well, in accordance 
with PHE information; however, a substantial minority thought they should self-isolate (23.7%) and 
call NHS 111 for advice (18.8%), respectively, while the PHE leaflets advised these actions only for 
those with symptoms.  
 
Attitudes to official advice 
In total 104/121 (86.0%) passengers stated that they had read the leaflet (94 read the English 
version, 30 read the Mandarin version and 20 read it in both languages). Only 6 (5.0%) stated that 
they had not read it in either language.  
Table 3. Attitudes to official Public Health England advice in a sample of 104 passengers arriving at 













The leaflet and poster at the UK airport 









The leaflet and poster at the UK airport 









I have received enough information 










I have received enough information 
about how and when to avoid contact 









Note: Percentages are for those who responded to the statement 
Overall, respondents thought the leaflet and poster at the airport were easy to understand (84.4% 
agree or strongly agree) and trusted the official advice (84.2% agree or strongly agree). In addition, 
the majority of respondents agreed that they had received enough information, including what to do 
if they developed COVID-19 symptoms (84.1%) and how and when to avoid contact with others 
(84.2%) (Table 3). Respondents may have reported their responses to the leaflet handed out on the 
flight, rather than to the leaflets and posters at the airport, but both had the same content. 
 
Qualitative findings 
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15 interviews were conducted with passengers who had arrived on surveyed flights and consented 
to participate when completing the questionnaire. The age range was 21 to over 80 years, with five 
men and 10 women. Among the 15 participants, six were retired, five worked full-time, three were 
full-time students and one was unemployed. Most participants were permanent residents in the UK; 
three were limited-duration residents and two were temporary visitors. The majority (11 
participants) were British, three were Chinese, and one was from New Zealand. All three Chinese 
participants could speak Mandarin and English and had seen PHE information in both languages. All 
White participants could speak only English. 
The results represent passengers’ views and perspectives on the public health advice and their 
experience of self-isolation. These views clustered into five broad themes, (i) understandings related 
to COVID-19, including sub-themes of COVID-19 knowledge, personal or lived experience, exposure, 
domestic concerns, personal protective equipment; (ii) attitudes towards information materials and 
presence, self-isolation and lockdown, and sub-themes including attitudes to advice, information 
and presence, attitudes to self-isolation and lockdown, public adherence and perceptions of others, 
social pressure; (iii) practices and experience during the pandemic, and sub-themes of difficulties, 
feeling lucky, self-disciplinary, compulsory measures; (iv) Information and advice, and sub-themes of 
UK official advice, other source information, clear, reliability; (v) Support, and sub-themes including 
emotional support, healthcare support, information support, instrumental support. Only those 
themes relating directly to the reception of public health advice are reported below. 
 
Knowledge of symptoms and actions to take if symptomatic 
13 out of 15 participants recalled that they received the information leaflet from UK authorities/PHE 
during the flight or at the airport in Singapore or China. Most were impressed with the amount of 
information and measures being taken at departure airports and surprised that ‘there was almost 
nothing’ [Participant 11] and ‘nobody seemed to care’ [Participant 8] on arrival at LHR. Only three 
passengers saw posters, which they said were not eye-catching, and two mentioned there was hand 
sanitiser at passport control area: 
‘I walked fast passing (those leaflets/posters), didn’t pay much attention.’ [Participant 15] 
Cough, fever/high temperature and, as the disease progresses, breathing difficulties were the most 
frequently mentioned symptoms; ‘you may be asymptomatic and so you have a cough or you might 
come down with a full-blown fever to the point where really you cannot breathe’ [Participant 1]. 
Many passengers believed that other diverse symptoms such as headache, fatigue, loss of smell and 
taste were associated with COVID-19 but they were not included in the official case definition (see 
Table 1) at the time. 
Most participants noted that they would start with self-isolation when symptoms were mild, and 
NHS 111 should be called if symptoms progress, indicating they would follow the official advice and 
base their actions on the disease severity: 
‘Well the first thing I would have had to have done would be to self-isolate. … And if the symptoms 
obviously got progressively worse I would then either contact my GP or phone 111.  But it’s a fairly 
straightforward process that’s been set up to do this’. [Participant 9] 
 
Attitudes to official advice 
 . CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a 
perpetuity. 
 is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in(which was not certified by peer review)preprint 
The copyright holder for thisthis version posted September 25, 2020. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.09.22.20195628doi: medRxiv preprint 
The content of UK official advice itself was seen as reasonable and adequate; the majority of 
passengers commented that it was ‘quite clear and sensible’ [Participant 5] and felt the government 
was taking some action in response to the outbreak. Some participants believed more information 
or further clarification of the official advice should be given; for example, one passenger who stayed 
in the UK for nine days suggested adding a message on the official leaflet that, ‘if you are 
experiencing any symptoms of coronavirus please contact your airline company and do not travel’ 
[Participant 1].   
Participants mentioned common concerns that people may disregard official advice in the UK, citing 
their lived experience in affected countries where televised public health information for COVID-19, 
including on social distancing and washing your hands, was ‘reinforced every time there was a 
commercial break’, whereas in the UK ‘it’s random’ [Participant 2]. They noted that the lack of visible 
pandemic control measures at LHR gave ‘a false sense of security’ [Participant 7] and therefore 
suggested reinforcing official advice and taking other actions such as installing temperature 
scanners, handing out materials and increasing the number of personnel at airports, as well as 
enacting more compulsory measures and regulations to limit close contact and quarantine arrivals.  
‘At Heathrow, we arrived and it was like nothing was wrong in the UK, so I think that causes a false 
sense of security, so maybe if there was more of a presence, like information, temperature check, 
personnel etc, people might take it more seriously.’ [Participant 5] 
‘Well they could have had thermal imaging cameras, they could have had medical staff in protective 
clothing there to talk to people whose temperature came up as above the norm, they could have 
then asked people in those conditions, you know, if they met those conditions to isolate them, you 
know.’ [Participant 8] 
 
Acting on official advice  
Most participants had acquired information and advice from both the UK and the countries of 
departure, regardless of their usual country of residence. Since COVID-19 had already spread across 
the countries from which they had travelled, participants believed they were ‘educated enough 
about it’ [Participant 7] and that they treated it more seriously than people in the UK; they were, as 
one participant put it, ‘a bit ahead of the game’ [Participant 3]. When arriving in the UK, as a 
precaution many participants voluntarily self-isolated or tried to distance themselves and skipped 
certain activities where people would be gathering, even though this was not the official advice at 
that time:   
‘…even though there wasn’t the, you know, that wasn’t really about the distancing over here, but we 
just thought we won’t see family and friends for some time just because we’d been or gone through 
Singapore.’ [Participant 3] 
‘I didn't dare go to the university to take the exam on Monday, because the teacher said if you didn't 
feel well you could stay at home and didn't have to go to the university to take the exam.’ 
[Participant 13] 
Participants expressed awareness of their risk of exposure while travelling that led some of them to 
self-isolate. They further noted that by doing so, they would not get blamed if any of their loved 
ones did get sick; one said they knew there was likely going to be a ‘stigma’ around them since they 
were coming from an affected country [Participant 10]: 
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‘…but being on the plane with other people coming from who knows where with who knows what, 
you know, we were a bit more concerned which is why we isolated when we came home.’ 
[Participant 11] 
‘We didn’t want to put any of our family members or friends at risk in case we were carrying the virus 
but didn’t know it.’ [Participate 2] 
‘…we sort of knew pretty much that the chances of us giving him (family member) anything were 
miniscule, because we wouldn’t have put anybody at risk if we really thought that there was a 
chance but we just didn’t want it on us’. [Participant 3]  
They observed that tasks needing to be done outside the home could affect how people act on the 
advice; they therefore suggested ‘the British supermarkets and the Chinese supermarkets can offer 
home delivery’ [Participant 13], which could contribute to minimise daily population flow and 
interaction. Despite experiencing some mental pressure, participants expressed they felt fortunate 
to have the physical and social resources to manage their self-isolation effectively, while being 
aware that this was not the case for everyone: 
‘There is a temptation for people to get back home before you go to see a doctor, particularly if 
you’re living in a… going to a foreign country, you’re going there on holiday.’ [Participant 1] 
‘I can’t think about it, I have to think about we’re very lucky, we’re luckier than most and if I want to 
go down and walk along the beach I sort of can. … I think if somebody is locked up in a one-bedroom 
flat in London it will be horrible, it must be horrible for them…’ [Participant 10] 
The reasonable and clear official information was seen to shape the public’s authentic 
understanding of the COVID-19 crisis and could therefore promote public acceptance of official 
advice. Participants further emphasised the crucial role of community support; ‘I think providing they 
have sufficient support in their communities there is no reason at all why anybody should not self-
isolate’ [Participant 9]. 
‘I can’t think why you would not follow the official advice but I think the mere…at the time the 
number of people who had died from Coronavirus it was rising but I think… and the numbers were 




Our findings show that passengers arriving from China and Singapore during the early stages of the 
COVID-19 pandemic in the UK found the content of official public health information provided in PHE 
leaflets to be clear and easy to understand. Most could correctly identify the recommendations 
concerning actions to be taken in the event of becoming symptomatic/arriving from certain 
destinations and considered the advice provided to be acceptable and trustworthy. However, there 
was some uncertainty as to whether those arriving from one of those countries or territories listed in 
PHE information other than Hubei or Wuhan should proactively self-isolate or call the NHS helpline. 
The majority of those surveyed (83%) and interviewed were also able to correctly identify all three 
symptoms described in the leaflets and poster (cough, fever, shortness of breath), but over half of 
those surveyed and many of those interviewed also identified fatigue and sore throat as symptoms, 
with substantial proportions identifying other symptoms that were not included in the official case 
definition during the evaluation period. This definition changed over time, alongside evolving 
 . CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a 
perpetuity. 
 is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in(which was not certified by peer review)preprint 
The copyright holder for thisthis version posted September 25, 2020. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.09.22.20195628doi: medRxiv preprint 
scientific knowledge of the virus, and some symptoms identified by our respondents had been 
recognised as the common manifestations of COVID-19, including anosmia that has more recently 
been introduced into the official PHE case definition. Since these passengers were arriving from 
countries where the pandemic, as well as COVID-19 policy responses to it, were further developed 
than in England when the study was conducted,[8, 9] their responses may well reflect knowledge 
acquired  elsewhere as much as the official PHE advice.  
Support for this is shown by the fact that while most survey respondents indicated they had received 
sufficient information both about what to do if symptoms developed and about how and when to 
avoid contact with other people, the PHE leaflets and posters provided no information on avoidance 
of contact, beyond the requirement to stay indoors if symptomatic or when arriving from specified 
source locations. Our interview data support the survey findings that respondents believed the 
official information was adequate; however, their accounts show that respondents’ knowledge was 
substantially informed by familiarity with public health interventions being taken elsewhere to 
contain transmission. On the other hand, for these passengers, the perceived lack of visible 
measures in place on arrival into the UK indicated a worrying lack of official concern about COVID-
19. Their comments were verified by our research team’s observations that the design and 
positioning of PHE information at the arrival airport made it largely unnoticeable to arriving 
passengers (see Fig 1), as well as other studies that have pointed out an initial rejection of ‘eye 
catching measures’ in the UK at the beginning of the outbreak.[10] Such expressions of concern 
among passengers suggest that while the intended purpose of the leaflets was to provide 
information and guidance that would encourage people to act in accordance with recommended 
behaviours, recipients regard the provision of information and other visible public health measures 
as an index of the adequacy of governmental response to the pandemic. Therefore, the advice and 
information served two purposes during the pandemic – the original role of providing public health 
messaging, and also reflecting the performance of government and authorities. Under the 
circumstances that passengers have been well informed by knowledge from elsewhere, they seem 
to be more concerned about the other role, the performance, of advice and information. 
Respondents’ good understanding of the content of the PHE leaflet, which they received on the 
plane, contrasted starkly with their reports of low visibility of, and minimal interaction with, similar 
materials on arrival at the airport. This suggests that providing public health information in-flight, by 
announcements and distribution of leaflets – when passengers have the time to read it with few 
distractions – may be the more effective strategy. 
 
Figure 1. Public Health England poster, providing health and safety advice on COVID-19, at 
Terminal 3 Arrivals, London Heathrow Airport in west London, 4 March 2020 
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Source: photos taken by researchers  
Note: left, COVID-19 poster on pillar; right, COVID-19 leaflet stand (right hand side) 
 
Our interviewees suggested a range of additional public health interventions that were not in force 
when they arrived, such as restricted contact tracing, widespread testing and self-
isolation/quarantine for all arrivals, many of which were used for the purpose of containing viral 
transmission in countries like Singapore and China and were eventually implemented in the UK.[11] 
This again indicates that passengers were using prior experience of pandemic control measures 
elsewhere to judge the extent to which UK authorities were taking the pandemic seriously, based on 
their experience of arrival at a UK airport. The survey and interviewees’ accounts pointed to their 
own self-discipline not only in acting on official UK advice regarding self-isolation for those arriving 
from certain destinations or subsequently developing symptoms, but also in some cases going 
beyond it by doing spontaneously as an additional protective measure. This predominantly related 
to their perceptions of exposure risk in affected countries from which they had travelled or from the 
journey itself, as well as to concerns about potential stigmatisation should family or colleagues 
subsequently become infected. Similar findings have been reported by previous studies[12, 13] 
indicating that travellers arriving from Ebola-affected countries restricted movement to avoid 
stigmatisation by the community. The public health interventions mentioned by passengers and 
their behaviours suggest screening people at entry, as done in ‘enhanced screening’ for Ebola, may 
help to reassure the travelling public that containment measures are in place, even if border 
screening is in reality ineffective. However, screening measures generate other difficulties such as 
how to accurately identify targeted passengers and how to avoid social stigmatisation.[5, 14] 
This study has a number of limitations. In our qualitative work, interviewees were recruited based on 
survey participants’ willingness to consent to follow-up interviews rather than from a purposive 
sample. It is possible that such participants may hold stronger views than those who refuse, or may 
come from particular groups such as retired people. The interviewees’ accounts may therefore not 
accurately represent the views of all passengers who completed the survey. However, the 
demographic characteristics of interviewees indicated a relatively comprehensive coverage of both 
British residents and other nationalities coming to the UK for a variety of purposes, so the sample 
composition seemed reasonable. Given the time that elapsed between survey completion and 
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interview as well as influences from the rapid changes in both pandemic and UK policies, 
interviewees’ impressions on the presence at the airport and their perceptions and views might have 
changed in the interim; all interviews were completed within 7 weeks from passengers’ arrive date 
to minimise these effects. Finally, both study size and early opportunities to use our findings to 
inform the content and delivery of official public health guidance were limited by difficulties in 
gaining airside access at airports and obtaining cooperation from airlines, so that by the time we 
implemented data collection, the number of flights and passengers arriving from affected countries 
had already diminished drastically.     
 
CONCLUSION 
Our findings confirm the clarity and acceptability of public health guidance on COVID-19 provided to 
passengers arriving into UK ports in the early stages of the pandemic. However, they also 
demonstrate a widespread perception that the provision of information alone on arrival was an 
insufficient official response to this global public health emergency at that stage in the pandemic. 
This finding is cause for concern since it may reduce trust in official sources, an established driver of 
nonadherence to public health interventions.[15] It also indicates that the public health information 
provision at borders should be appraised not only with respect to its functional effectiveness in 
imparting guidance and encouraging behaviours to control transmission, but also with regard to its 
perceived effectiveness in furnishing public assurance of official action to contain the disease threat. 
We also found that travellers arriving from countries where the epidemic was already established 
frequently had knowledge of COVID-19 and of various public health measures to contain 
transmission that were not derived from official UK advice or present in the UK at that time. In a 
rapidly evolving international health crisis, and particularly one in which understanding of the 
disease threat is partial and changing, evaluating public understanding by reference to locally 
defined parameters can be unreliable, not least because public knowledge among those with 
experience from elsewhere may be more advanced than local understanding. This indicates the 
value of appraising public perceptions not only to measure understanding and adherence, but also 
to gain potential insights into future appropriate measures and their likely acceptability. Our study 
also demonstrates the complexity of health policy decision-making in public health emergencies of 
international importance and provides fresh insights into the need to take greater account of the 
diverse information sources on which international travellers may draw. Finally, it highlights the 
importance of establishing efficient mechanisms for rapid appraisal and feedback to public health 
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